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he eighteenth-century French philo-
sopher Voltaire  once  asked  how  it 
was that the great Newtonian heav-
ens  conform  to  the  commands  of  physi-
cal law, but there remains in the universe 
“a little creature five feet tall, acting just 
as he pleases, solely according to his own 
caprice?” (Robinson, 1980).
The question was rhetorical, of course. 
A  century  earlier,  Voltaire’s  compatriot 
René  Descartes  had  famously  offered 
humans  an  exemption  from  the  natural 
order,  by  suggesting  that  causal  princi-
ples  applied  to  all  intelligent  behaviour 
in  animals  and  all  automatic  behaviour 
in humans—such as snatching one’s hand 
out  of  a  flame  —but  that  humans  alone 
possessed  a  pure  thinking  substance,  a 
conscious, wilful and rational soul created 
by God. This soul, Descartes said, directed 
all  voluntary  movements  of  the  body, 
through the so-called animal spirits. Such 
thinking  could  no  longer  stand, Voltaire 
insisted. The time had come for humans 
to discover and acquiesce to their place in 
the natural scheme of things, regardless of 
the outcome. 
Consequences  aside,  what  would  it 
mean,  pragmatically,  to  put  humans  in 
their place in nature? From the beginning, 
the answer seemed clear: there must be no 
more exceptionalism. The human mind—
the consciousness in each of us that peers 
through telescopes, scribbles calculations, 
falls in love, practices charity and ponders 
infinity—must be shown to be a product of 
the same impersonal forces that command 
the movements of the planets. This, in turn, 
meant that the new sciences must explain 
the functional relationship between human 
conscious experience and the small lump 
of living matter housed within the human 
skull, whose affinity for all things mental 
had been acknowledged even by Descartes: 
the human brain.
More than two centuries later, Voltaire’s 
challenge  still  resonates. Today,  we  have 
high-tech brain-imaging machines, a gen-
eral theory of the origin of life, a map of the 
human genome and a growing arsenal of 
pharmaceutical interventions to modulate 
or enhance our brain functions. However, 
in spite of all that, many of us still remain 
convinced that the truths of the brain—the 
logic and laws of this organ as a material 
entity—do  not  capture  everything  about 
humans. Any theory of our humanness must 
account for moral choice, existential pas-
sion and social contracts. It must be able to 
explain cathedrals, stock markets, wedding 
ceremonies,  Shakespeare  and  people’s 
willingness to die for their God. Moreover, 
most of us do not yet see how to relate the 
mind that seems to underlie those things to 
the material workings of brain processes. 
As the philosopher Colin McGinn put it, 
“The mind–body problem is the problem of 
understanding how [a] miracle is wrought” 
(McGinn, 1989). 
Is  the  problem  of  housing  the  mind 
inside the brain really so hard? Or is it pos-
sible that it feels so intractable because we 
are still trying to build on the clumsy or 
philosophically naive efforts of some of our 
forebears, whose labours lacked the finesse 
that we should rightly demand from today’s 
brain sciences? 
T
o find out, we should begin with the 
German physician Franz Joseph Gall 
at the start of the nineteenth century. 
Gall is well known for his organology or 
phrenology—that is, the attempt to deter-
mine character, personality traits or crimi-
nality from the skull’s shape—but too often 
his system is regarded as a mere pseudo-
science that is of no interest to today’s stu-
dents of the brain. That supposition is wrong: 
without Gall’s interventions, the history of 
the brain sciences would almost certainly 
have developed differently. Gall offered two 
rules for how to house a mind inside a brain, 
which still dominate current thinking. The 
first rule was that to claim the human mind 
for science, you must first break it down into 
a fixed number of discrete functional units. 
The second rule was that having identified 
those functional units, you must then locate 
each of them in a discrete area of the brain.
These rules gambled on a bold assump-
tion: that scientists and human brains had 
similar  strategies  for  conceptualizing  the 
functional  building  blocks  of  mental  life. 
That  is  to  say,  brain  localization  theory 
under Gall—and beyond—began with con-
ventional  psychological  categories  such 
as ‘language’ and ‘aggression’, and hoped 
that these would represent discrete natural 
entities with a distinct physiological mech-
anism behind them. The gamble helped to 
launch powerful work in both the laboratory 
and the clinic, but was it rooted in a true 
premise? Even today, we cannot tell whether 
the  British  neurologist  Sir  Charles  Scott 
Sherrington  was  right  when  he  predicted 
that the scientific contributions of the local-
izers from Gall onwards would, when ulti-
mately analysed, “resolve into components 
for which at present we have no names” 
(Sherrington, 1940).
Any theory of our humanness 
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When Gall tried to make a 
house  for  the  mind  in  the 
brain and located each com-
ponent of mental activity in 
its own room, he was chal-
lenging  Christian  dualistic 
theo  logies  that  required  the 
soul  to  be  both  immaterial 
and undivided. His publica-
tions  were  placed  on  the 
Catholic  list  of  prohibited 
books, and he was denied a 
Christian  burial.  Nevertheless, 
it is less appreciated that he 
never questioned the insight 
from the German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant that all living 
beings—in  contrast  to  rocks 
and  planets,  for  example—
are  animated  by  a  sense  of 
natural  purpose    (Zumbach, 
1984). For Gall, the phreno-
logical  faculties—from  lan-
guage to maternal love—might 
indeed  have  been  grounded 
in brain matter, but they also 
had  distinctive  roles  in  the 
larger economy of human life; 
each existed for a reason and 
did  not  simply  result  from 
a cause. 
By the late 1840s, however, 
this Kantian vision of multiple 
causalities  was  increasingly  dismissed  as 
the thinking of a generation of idealists. In 
particular, the so-called organic physicists 
in  Germany—Hermann  von  Helmholtz, 
Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Ernst Brücke and 
Karl  Ludwig—explicitly  resolved  that  the 
time had come to build a science of life in 
which all explanations would be identical 
to the explanations in the physical sciences. 
As Du Bois-Reymond wrote to a friend at 
the time, “Brücke and I pledged a solemn 
oath to put into power this truth: no other 
forces than the common physical–chemi-
cal ones are active within the organism. In 
those cases which cannot at the time be 
explained by these forces one has either to 
find the specific way or form of their action 
by  means  of  the  physical–mathematical 
method, or to assume new forces equal in 
dignity  to  the  chemical–physical  forces 
inherent in matter, reducible to the forces of 
attraction and repulsion” (Sulloway, 1979).
F
rom the synthesis of urea in the labo-
ratory  to  the  establishment  of  cell 
theory  and  mechanistic  approaches 
to embryonic development, the nineteenth 
century  saw  one  milestone  discovery 
after another that seemed to support the 
biophysicists’  cause.  Of  them  all,  how-
ever, none seemed to strike a firmer blow 
against  exceptionalism  than  the  first  law 
of  thermodynamics,  which  asserts  that 
all  forms  of  energy—mechanical,  kinetic 
and  thermal—are  equivalent  and  can  be 
transformed into one another. This implied 
that there was nothing ‘extra’ needed—or, 
indeed,  allowed—to  understand  life, 
including  the  lives  and  minds  of  human 
beings. As the medical physiologist Rudolf 
Virchow  described,  “…the  same  kind  of 
electrical process takes place in the nerve 
as in the telegraph line […] the living body 
generates its warmth through combustion 
just as warmth is generated in 
the oven; starch is transformed 
into sugar in the plant and ani-
mal just as it is in a factory” 
(Virchow, 1858).
What  would  it  mean  to 
begin with a vision of the brain 
as  a  ‘parliament  of  localized 
faculties’, as Gall had done, but 
then to go one step further and 
insist that the brain, the same 
as all living organs, generates 
mental life in the same way that 
an oven generates warmth? In 
1874, the German psychiatrist 
Carl  Wernicke—at  the  preco-
cious age of 26—published a 
monograph on the problem of 
language loss (aphasia) and cer-
ebral localization entitled The 
Aphasic  Symptom  Complex 
(Wernicke, 1874) that seemed 
to  answer  this  question.  It 
built on the work of the previ-
ous  decade,  and  effectively 
amounted  to  a  validation  by 
mainstream medicine of at least 
a variant of Gall’s approach but 
with a key difference. 
Here is the background. In 
the  early  1860s,  the  French 
anthropologist  Paul  Broca 
used  clinical  and  anatomi-
cal evidence to persuade his colleagues, 
and eventually much of the larger inter-
national scientific community, that one of 
the phrenological mental faculties—what 
he  called  the  “faculty  of  articulate  lan-
guage”—had a discrete seat in the brain, 
and that this lay in the third frontal convo-
lution of the left frontal lobe of the human 
cortex  (Broca,  1861,  1865).  Wernicke, 
taking his starting point from the larger tra-
dition that Broca had inaugurated, began 
with  the  observation  that  patients  with 
damage to the left temporal lobe lose their 
capacity  to  comprehend  language,  even 
though  they  are  generally  able  to  speak 
fluently  but  do  not  make  much  sense. 
Wernicke contrasted this type of language 
disturbance with the syndrome identified 
by  Broca  in  which  people  continue  to 
understand what is said to them, but lose 
their capacity to express themselves. 
Wernicke  was  not  only  completing 
Broca’s work but also placing it in a new 
context. He proposed that one could not 
locate  complex  psychological  units  such 
as language in the brain, as Broca and his 
When Gall tried to make a house 
for the mind in the brain […] 
he was challenging Christian 
dualistic theologies that required 
the soul to be both immaterial 
and undivided
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adherents—following Gall’s lead—had indi-
cated. All that could be localized were prim-
itive ‘memory traces’ or impersonal records 
of sensory impressions and motor actions 
undertaken by the organism. On the basis 
of work on the basic neuroanatomy of spi-
nal reflex action into the cortex, Wernicke 
proposed a model in which the rear of the 
cortex was specialized for processing and 
storing incoming sensory data, and the front 
part  consisted  of  motor  projections  and 
centres that responded to sensory informa-
tion  with  appropriate  behaviours.  Within 
the cortex itself, Wernicke claimed, all sen-
sory–motor information mixed and commu-
nicated along ‘fibres’ that criss-crossed the 
cortex like telegraph lines. In fact, the brain 
was not a parliament of purposeful faculties; 
rather, it was a machine that generated com-
plex mental processes directly from primitive 
non-thinking processes.
Had  Wernicke  provided  an  explana-
tion of how—to quote McGinn again—the 
“water of the physical brain is turned into 
the wine of consciousness”? At the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, the Spanish 
neuroanatomist  Santiago  Ramon  y  Cajal 
expressed his doubts: “However excellent, 
every physiological doctrine of the brain 
based  on  localizations  leaves  us  abso-
lutely in the dark over the detailed mecha-
nisms of the psychological acts” (y Cajal, 
1960). In the end, the alchemy by which 
the brain became the mind would require 
knowledge of the “nature of the nervous 
wave,  the  energy  transformations  which 
[the mind] brings about or suffers at the 
moment when it is borne…”.
S
ince  the  mid-eighteenth  century, 
researchers  had  gathered  evidence 
that  this  nervous  energy  was  elec-
trical  in  nature.  Then,  in  the  1840s,  du 
Bois-Reymond  demonstrated  nerve  action 
potential that generated a constant current 
after stimulation. With the establishment—
largely through y Cajal’s efforts—of so-called 
neuronal  theory  (the  idea  that  nerve  cells 
are separated in space and communicate by 
some  yet-to-be-determined  process)  scien-
tists eventually developed an idea of a brain 
more dynamic than so far had been con-
ceived. They began to visualize how electri-
cal messages passing through the physical 
architecture of the nervous system might be 
purposefully  directed,  diverted,  inhibited 
and augmented at different neuronal junc-
tions, similar to a train having its direction 
and speed set and reset at various railroad 
switch points (y Cajal, 1954).
In  the  early  twentieth  century,  the 
English  physiologist  Sherrington  recog-
nized the empirical potential of neuronal 
theory. Working with dogs, he mapped the 
pathway taken by an impulse as it moved 
from  a  sensory  receptor  on  the  periph-
ery—in this case, a tactile receptor on the 
skin—into the spinal cord and brain, and 
back out through a motor pathway where it 
produced a scratching response. The most 
important outcome of this work was a com-
plex understanding of the reflex as a set of 
integrated  interactions  between  electrical 
impulses  on  the  one  hand  and  chemical 
signals emitted at nerve junctions—which 
Sherrington named synapses—on the other. 
However, this did not mean that the brain 
worked  like  a  train  moving  purposively 
along tracks with no driver and no switch-
master. In Man on His Nature, Sherrington 
painted a picture of the brain not as a mere 
mechanism,  but  rather  as  “an  enchanted 
loom  where  millions  of  flashing  shuttles 
weave a dissolving pattern, always a mean-
ingful pattern though never an abiding one” 
(Sherrington, 1940). Moreover, he implied 
that the mind might be the weaver, because 
in spite of more than a century of efforts to 
house it firmly in the brain, the sciences still 
had to “regard the relation of mind to brain 
as not merely unresolved but still devoid of 
a basis for its very beginning”.
These might have been the foolish words 
of a scientist past his prime and feeling the 
chill  of  his  own  mortality.  Nevertheless, 
even if many would not have gone as far as 
Sherrington, some of the more thoughtful 
observers recognized that the expansion-
ist  ambitions  of  late  nineteenth-century 
brain  science  had  seen  several  setbacks. 
For  instance,  the  French  neurologist 
Jean-Martin Charcot had been humiliated 
when his efforts to make sense of hysteria 
as  a  neurological  disorder  according  to 
anatomical principles had failed. In fact, 
the  physical  symptoms  of  hysteria—the 
paralyses  and  the  loss  of  sensory  func-
tion—turned out to be highly plastic and 
responsive  to  social  cues.  More  specifi-
cally, one could make them disappear or 
change them using hypnotic suggestion. 
None of that made sense in the world of 
brain functioning that Charcot knew, where 
brain disorders either were caused by stable 
lesions or were not. In the wake of the con-
fusion, a nerve doctor from Vienna, Sigmund 
Freud,  arrived  on  the  scene  and  reinter-
preted hysteria as a disease not of defective 
brain functioning but rather of a disordered 
biography and traumatic memories, thereby 
inaugurating a new way of—supposedly sci-
entific—thinking about both the mind and 
its disorders, which declared the brain to be 
essentially irrelevant to the task. 
M
eanwhile,  other  discontented 
voices were being raised in neuro-
logy. Wernicke’s radically mecha-
nistic  model  of  mind–brain  functioning 
had  come  under  fire—particularly  in  the 
German-speaking  countries—by  a  group 
of dissatisfied scientists and clinicians who 
insisted that the mind was not something 
that could be broken down into primitive 
units  and  correlated  to  equally  primitive 
physiological  processes.  The  brain,  they 
said, had properties as a whole that influ-
enced  lower-level  functions  in  ways  that 
neurology had little, if any, idea of how to 
conceive. Take, for example, the phenom-
enon of functional recovery after stroke or 
other  brain  damage.  According  to  these 
dissatisfied researchers, the simple fact that 
brain-damaged people could improve over 
time,  and  regain  speech  and  movement, 
was  incompatible  with  the  nineteenth-
century model of the nervous system as a 
purely  mechanical  apparatus  operating 
according to fixed laws of reflex and asso-
ciation. Machines do not repair themselves 
after suffering damage, and functions ‘resid-
ing’  in  certain  fixed  regions  of  the  brain 
cannot reappear if those regions are perma-
nently destroyed. In this sense, the brain was 
not a machine—at least not in the way that 
people typically conceptualized the term. 
Even today, there are anomalies 
and internal divisions in the brave 
new world of brain science that 
indicate that we are not as close to 
fulfilling the hopes of the first bold 
generation of brain researchers as 
we might sometimes think
…the brain was not a parliament 
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To say this, however, was not to propose 
a return to the Cartesian view of the brain 
as an entity that stood in attendance on the 
needs  and  commands  of  a  transcendent 
mind. It was simply to insist that any intellec-
tually credible project to house a mind in a 
brain could not ignore anomalies that might 
demand some fundamental overhaul of core 
conceptual or methodological principles.
Today, this kind of radical talk perhaps 
seems quaint. We now believe that Freud 
is  dead—or  at  least  living  out  a  declin-
ing  reputation  in  academic  departments 
of literature and cultural studies. Holistic 
approaches to the brain are out of fashion 
and most are as confident as ever of the 
basic  ‘divide  and  conquer’  approach  to 
putting the mind inside the brain.
Many of the reasons for this are more tech-
nological than conceptual, and are linked 
to the rise of neuroimaging machines and 
new psychopharmaceutical interventions. If 
it is true that specific drugs affect particular 
mental afflictions, does this not imply that 
Gall was right to see the mind as a mosaic 
of functional building blocks, even if we are 
now more sophisticated and appreciate the 
need to focus not only on neuro  anatomy but 
also on neurochemistry? If different areas of 
the brain ‘light up’ on neuroimaging scans in 
real time when we think different thoughts, 
are we really so far from Gall’s contempo-
rary,  Charles  Bonnet,  who  proposed  that 
anyone  who  thoroughly  understood  the 
functional anatomy of the brain would be 
able to read all the thoughts passing through 
it “as in a book” (Harrington, 1987).
E
ven  today,  there  are  anomalies  and 
internal  divisions  in  the  brave  new 
world  of  brain  science  that  indicate 
that we are actually not as close to fulfilling 
the hopes of the first bold generation of brain 
researchers as we might sometimes think. In 
our  time,  ideas  of  hard-wired  localization 
still exist with models of the nervous system 
as a self-updating system of dynamic neural 
nets or autopoietic processes. Research into 
the neurochemistry of the nervous system has 
raised questions as to whether the brain and 
nervous system even exist as an independent 
entity, or whether they represent a part of a 
system of interconnected physiological and 
biochemical processes, including those that 
regulate the gut and the immune system. In 
this sense, it seems possible that at least some 
of the processes that we consider an essential 
part of the mind are not housed strictly in the 
brain, but move freely across the body. 
None of this requires a retreat from the 
naturalism  that Voltaire  demanded  of  an 
enlightened age. Nevertheless, the fact that 
various projects in the brain sciences do not 
map seamlessly onto one another is impor-
tant, as is the insistence with which many 
people—especially in the humanities and 
some  of  the  social  sciences—argue  that 
our humanness needs to be understood not 
only as a product of the brain, but also as 
a product and expression of cultural, social 
and interpersonal forces. When social sci-
entists and humanists resist the attempts of 
brain scientists to put the mind in its place, 
they are not just indulging in special plead-
ing,  expressing  intellectual  cowardice  or 
trying  to  preserve  space  for  something 
transcendent in us. Although these factors 
might sometimes be at play, history points 
to  a  more  straightforward  reason  for  the 
continuing  discontent  with,  and  internal 
divisions within, the brain sciences, even 
in these confident times. We are inheritors 
of a particular approach for housing a mind 
inside the brain—the ‘divide and conquer’ 
strategy—that has brought us far. However, 
history with all its dissension leads one to 
suspect that this strategy might not take us 
all the way home. The alchemy for trans-
forming the water of the brain into the wine 
of  consciousness  might  always  elude  us, 
but we can at least strive to fashion a bot-
tle with sufficient room to encompass the 
fullness both of what we are and of how we 
experience ourselves to be. 
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